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Abstract
In a micro-founded framework in line with the new open economy macroeconomics,
the paper shows that more centralized wage setting (CWS) and central bank conser-
vatism (CBC) curb unemployment only if labor market distortions are sizeable. When
labor market distortions are su¢ ciently low, employment may be maximized by atom-
istic wage setters or a populist CB. The comparison between a national monetary
policy (NMP) regime and the monetary union (MU) reveals that a move to a MU
boosts ination in the absence of strategic e¤ects. However, when strategic interac-
tions between CB(s) and trade unions are taken into account, the shift to a MU when
monopoly distortions are sizeable unambiguously increases welfare and employment
either in presence of a su¢ ciently conservative CB or with a fully CWS. Finally, when
labor market distortions are less relevant, an ultra-populist CB or atomistic wage set-
ters are optimal for the society and a shift to a MU regime is unambiguously welfare
improving.
JEL classication: E2, E42, E5, F31, F41
Keywords: Central bank conservatism, centralization of wage setting, inationary
bias, monetary union.
1 Introduction
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has ruled out the possibility of
using the exchange rate as a substitute for structural reforms among the euro area member
states. This implies that the costs of implementing ine¢ cient institutions become more
apparent since the lack of nominal exchange rate puts the burden of adjustment on labor
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and product markets. In this respect, adjustment can be achieved through movements in
the relative prices and wages.
Compared to the case of national monetary policy (NMP), EMU should impose less
discipline on wage setters for they perceive an increase in their wages to have a smaller
impact on the union-wide ination rate relative to the one on their country-specic in-
ation rate. This point has been recently stressed in literature on strategic wage setting
(e.g. Coricelli et al., 2004; Cukierman and Lippi, 2001; Soskice and Iversen, 1998; Grüner
and Hefeker, 1999).
However when countries trade with each other new issues arise from the strategic
interactions among the Home and Foreign central bank (CB) and Home and Foreign
labor unions. Cuciniello (2007) argues that, under a NMP regime, the optimal monetary
policies in the two countries are strategic complements and are inuenced by the labor
market adjustments. This paper aims to extend the setup by Lippi (2003) to an open
economy with monopolistic competitive rms so as to contribute with a study on the long
run macroeconomic consequences of a monetary regime shift from oating exchange rates
to a monetary union (MU).
We use a general-equilibrium model of two countries, di¤erent in size and labor market
institutions, characterized by monopolistic competition in the product market and union-
ized labor markets. In a micro-founded framework in line with the new open economy
macroeconomics, we show that, aside from the response of real wages to labor market con-
ditions, the move to a MU raises ination since it increases the common CBs temptation
to resort to surprise ination relative to national CBs. Moreover we demonstrate that
welfare and employment are unambiguously higher in a MU when monopoly distortions
in the labor market are not so relevant. By contrast, when labor market distortions are
sizeable the results may be ambiguous. In particular if the CB conservatism (CBC) is low,
there exists a level of Foreign CBC that renders welfare and employment higher under a
NMP regime, while for high levels of monetary conservatism employment and welfare are
maximized in a MU.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model in a MU regime.
Section 3-6 compute the optimal strategy of each player. Section 7 analyzes the e¤ects of
the number of unions and CBC on employment and ination in the two regimes. Section
8 presents the conclusions.
2 Economic Setup
The monetary union is formed by two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ). The world
size is normalized to 1; Home agents are indexed by numbers in the interval [0; ], while
Foreign agents reside on (; 1], where  2 (0; 1) is a measure of relative population and
economic size.
There are two types of goods in the MU, and each country specializes in the production
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of one type that, in turn, can be manufactured by a continuum of monopolistic competitive
rms in a variety of brands indexed by z 2 [0; 1]. The main feature of such a hypothesis is
that the degree of substitutability between types di¤ers from the degree of substitutability
between brands.
Labor is the only factor of production and is supplied in a variety of types dened in
the continuous interval (0; 1). All labor types are unionized and distributed equally among
trade unions. For a given wage, each agent is willing to provide whatever quantity of labor
is required to clear the market.
Henceforth we will focus mainly on the domestic country so as to compare its macro-
economic performance under a oating exchange rate (Cuciniello, 2007) and in a MU.
2.1 Supply side
Each rm is the sole producer of a particular brand z that is produced by using a continuum
of labor types according to the following decreasing-return-to-scale technology
YH(z) =
Z 1
0
Li(z)
 1
 di
 
 1
; 0 <  < 1;  > 1
where YH(z) is the output of the Home-produced brand z, Li(z) is the labor type i, 
captures the elasticity of substitution among labor types and  is representing the return
to scale parameter. Firms are assumed to have market power in the product market but
not in the labor market so that they take wages as given. Cost minimization implies the
following demand for each labor type i
Li(z) =

Wi
W
 
(YH(z))
1
 (1)
where
W =
Z 1
0
W 1 i di
 1
1 
is the aggregate wage index dened as the minimal nominal cost of producing a unit of
output and PH(z) is the price for a brand z charged by a domestic rm at Home.
2.2 Preferences
Each agent consumes a continuum of di¤erentiated goods and supplies a di¤erentiated
labor type. The agent js utility is dened over consumption and hours worked as follows:
Uj = logCj   k
2
(logLj)
2 ; k > 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where k is a preference parameter1. Following Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998), Cj is an index
of consumption of Home and Foreign goods (for a representative agent) dened as follows:
Cj =
Cj;HC
1 
j;F
(1  )1 
with
Cj;H =
"
1

 1

Z 1
0
(Cj;H(z))
 1
 dz
# 
 1
;
Cj;F =
"
1
1  
 1

Z 1
0
(Cj;F (z))
 1
 dz
# 
 1
;  > 1:
It is clear that the elasticity of substitution across brands produced within a country is ,
while the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods is 1.2
The optimal consumption allocation of a representative individual across the Home
and Foreign good is respectively
Cj;H = 

PH
P
 1
Cj ; Cj;F = (1  )

PF
P
 1
Cj
where
P = P HP
1 
F (2)
is the consumer price index (CPI) and
PH =

1

Z 1
0
PH(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
; PF =

1
1  
Z 1
0
PF (z)
1 dz
 1
1 
, (3)
are the Home and Foreign producers index, respectively.
2.3 Individual budget constraints
To complete the qualication of the individuals problem, we consider the agents budget
constraint. Each j-th individual draws a salary for the labor type supplied to rms which,
in turn, distribute dividends evenly among their owners (all of the workers). Markets are
1Two conditions are to be satised by the utility function. The rst is the disutility of work ( Uj
Lj
< 0,
which implies logLj > 0). The second is the concavity of the utility function in leisure (
2Uj
L2j
=   k
L2j
(1 
logLj) < 0; implying that logLj < 1). The assumption k >  guarantees that in equilibrium 0 < logLj < 1
holds (see equation (38)).
2The parameter  > 1 is the price elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist. The inequality
constraint ensures an interior equilibrium with a positive level of output. This relationship will become
apparent later when we solve for the optimal price setting.
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complete domestically and international equity trade is forbidden3. Moreover, in order
to pay for nominal expenses, cash in advance is needed. Under these assumptions, the
agents budget constraint is given by
Mj  PCj =WjLj +Dj ; (4)
whereMj are individual js money balances, Wj is the nominal wage and Dj are agent
js dividends received by all domestic rms.
2.4 Demand side
The allocation of a representative individuals demand across the Home- and Foreign-
produced brands yields
Cj;H(z) =
1


PH(z)
PH
 
Cj;H =

PH(z)
PH
 PH
P
 1
Cj ; (5)
Cj;F (z) =
1
1  

PF (z)
PF
 
Cj;F =

PF (z)
PF
 PF
P
 1
Cj (6)
where PH(z) and PF (z) are the prices for a brand z charged by a domestic and foreign
rm at Home, respectively4. The law of one price is assumed to hold across all individual
brands, so that Pc(z) = P c (z), 8z 2 [0; 1], where asterisks denote Foreign values of
the corresponding Home variables, and c 2 [H;F ] : Moreover, because Home and Foreign
agents have identical preferences, the law of one price implies that purchasing power parity
must hold for the consumer price indexes:
P = P :
Thus integrating the demand for a Home-produced brand (5) and Foreign-produced
brand (6) across all agents yields the total demand faced by a rm z:
Yc(z) =

Pc(z)
Pc
 Pc
P
 1
CW (7)
where CW  C+(1 )C is the total consumption in the world economy, C  1
R 
0 Cjdj
is the per capita consumption of a Home agent and C
  11 
R 1
 Cjdj is the per capita
consumption of a Foreign resident5.
3However, securities markets are redundant in this model so as current accounts always balance in
equilibrium (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1998).
4Recall that  > 1 captures the elasticity of substitution among varieties, while the elasticity of substi-
tution between the domestic and foreign good is equal to 1.
5Note that CW is both per capita and total world consumption.
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The goods-market-clearing condition implies that total output demands equal supplies,
i.e.

h
PC + (1  )PC
i
= PHYH (8)
(1  )
h
PC + (1  )PC
i
= PFYF (9)
where YH 
R 1
0 YH(z)dz and YF 
R 1
0 YF (z)dz. From equation (8) and (9) we can derive
the following expression:
PHY H = PFY F (10)
where Y H  1
R 1
0 YH(z)dz and Y F  11 
R 1
0 YF (z)dz. Relation (10), together with the
assumption that agents do not hold international assets, implies that current accounts
always are zero (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1998) and that
CW = C = C

:6 (11)
Let MH 
R 
0 Mjdj and MF 
R 1
 Mjdj be the total money supply in the Home and
Foreign country, respectively. We assume that total money supply in the monetary union
is distributed across the two regions according to the country size as follows
MU =M

HM
1 
F : (12)
Normalizing the previous period nominal money supply, the current nominal money sup-
plies can be expressed as
MU = 1 +mU
where mU  logMU stands for percentage increases.
Finally, using equation (11), (8) and the cash in advance hypothesis, the aggregate-
nominal demand (7) in the domestic country can be rewritten as
PHYH 
Z 1
0
PH(z)YH(z)dz =MH : (13)
Likewise in the Foreign country the aggregate nominal demand is proportional to money
supply
PFYF 
Z 1
0
PF (z)YF (z)dz =MF : (14)
6This can be easily proved by using the relation (10) into the individual budget constraint as follows:
C =
PHY H
P
; C

=
PFY F
P
:
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2.5 Unions
The Home country is populated by a nite number of unions, nH . Since all labor types
are unionized and equally distributed among unions, each union has mass 1=nH . In our
setup the degree of centralization of wage setting (CWS) is equal to union size so that the
smaller is the number of unions, the more relevant is the impact of their wage settlement
on aggregate variables. In this respect the CWS is directly related to the unionscapacity
to internalize the macroeconomic consequences of wage variations7.
The representative union is benevolent, i.e. it maximizes the utility of her members
under the workersbudget constraint (4):
Vi = nH
Z
j2i
Ujdj: (15)
We assume that each worker (and the union that represents her) takes prots as given8.
The Home union sets the same rate of growth of the nominal wage !i among her members
so as to maximize her own objective function. It is convenient to express the nominal
wage of worker i, Wi; and the CPI in the Home country as
Wi = 1 + !i ; P = 1 + ;
where  is domestic ination rate9.
The benevolent union hypothesis is in line with the trade union behavior surveyed by
Oswald (1982) whose objective function usually includes real wages and unemployment10.
2.6 Central Bank
Drawing on the literature on time inconsistency in monetary policy, we assume that the
monetary authority is ination averse and cares about the real performance in the economy,
which in our setup corresponds to agentsutility11.
We draw on Lippi (2003) and assume that the common CB aims at maximizing the
following targeting rule:
7Drawing on Guzzo and Velasco (1999) we refer to such capacity as internalization e¤ect.
8Aside from monopoly power, this adds an other distortion introduced in the model. Conversely, when
we present the CB problem below, the CB will allow for all economy-wide interactions so as to internalize
the e¤ect of D on the welfare of agents.
9The previous period of nominal wage and ination are nomalized to unity without loss of generality
since equilibrium outcome does not depend on it.
10Grüner and Hefeker (1999), Soskice and Inversen (2001), Cukierman and Lippi (2001) evaluate the
macroeconomic e¤ect of monetary unication when unions are averse to ination. However we focus on
microeconomic instead of macroeconomic foundations to analyze unionsbehavior.
11The paper investigates how the design of the monetary institution a¤ects the country performance.
The notion of an ination averse CB may be interpreted also as a kind of general institutional constraint
in the economy.
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U =
Z 1
0
Ujdj   U
2
2 U  0: (16)
The parameter U is the CBs degree of conservatism (Rogo¤, 1985a). If the level of
conservatism is zero the CB becomes a benevolent planner who cares only about the
agentswelfare.
2.7 Timing structure of the model
In the rst stage (at time 1), each union chooses the rate of growth of the nominal wage of
her members in a simultaneous game with Foreign and the other domestic unions so as to
maximize her objective function (15). Moreover, in the maximization problem each union
anticipates the reaction of the CB and of rms to her wage choice. The timing sequence is
built on the notion that nominal wages are substantially stickier than prices and monetary
policy. The rationale for such an assumption is that workers are normally under contract
for at least a year; thus, wage setters are committed to the bargained wage over the whole
period of the game.
In the second stage (at time 2) the common CB sets the money supply taking as given
the preset nominal wages and internalizing the reaction of rms. Monetary policy is hence
stickier than price setting12.
In the last stage (at time 3) each monopolistic competitive rm sets the price of her
own brand so as to maximize her prot, taking the general price level, nominal wages and
money supply as given13.
The three-stage game between rms, the monetary authority and labor unions is solved
by backward induction so as to nd the Nash sub-game perfect equilibrium.
3 Price setting
In the last stage of game each domestic rm maximizes the real prot function
(z) =
PH(z)
P
YH(z)  1
P
Z 1
0
WiLi(z)di (17)
under the following constraints:Z 1
0
WiLi(z)di =WYH(z)
1
 and YH(z) =

PH(z)
PH
 PH
P
 1
CW . (18)
12Models with a New Keynesian orientation à la Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) suppose that price
setters move rst than the monetary authority. However, the assumption of prices stickiness is more
debatable than wages stickiness (see Cukierman, 2004).
13Notice that the timing of the game implies no precommitment of the CB. Monetary policy is hence
set in a "discretionary" way. Moreover since rms are the last to move, prices may be considered as fully
exible.
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The rst constraint stems from the cost minimization problem of rms. The second one
is the result of the consumer problem derived previously. The usual prot maximization
condition that marginal revenue equals marginal cost may hence be written14:
PH(z)
P

1  1


=
1

W
P
YH(z)
1 
 (19)
In a symmetric equilibrium, where all rms have the same optimal price rule, the
price of a brand, Pc(z), coincides with the producer price index, Pc, and the output of a
representative rm Yc(z) equals the output of the country Yc for all z. Thus taking the
logarithms of condition (19) and using (13), the rst order condition yields15
H    = (!   ) + (1  )(mH   ): (20)
This relation shows that, although prices are fully exible, they do not completely
move when the money supply changes. As a matter of fact, it is not optimal for prot
maximizing rms to respond exactly in kind to the money supply as long as nominal
wages have not been changed. This implies that the monetary authority may a¤ect real
variables, even when prices are fully exible, for nominal wages are contractually xed
(Cukierman, 2004).
Arranging equation (20), we obtain the following negative relation between real money
balances and wages:
mH   H =   
1  (!   H) (21)
From the denition of the CPI (2), the previous equations imply that the general price
level can be rewritten in terms of Home and Foreign wages and money supplies as follows:
U = (1  )mU + !U (22)
where !U  ! + (1  )!:
An accommodating monetary policy operates in a country through the expansion of
the demand faced by each monopolistic rm boosting in this way the ination rate. At this
stage Home and Foreign wages a¤ect ination in the country only through their impact
on input costs which in turn determine Home and Foreign good prices, respectively. In
the following sections we will see that the monetary policy is also inuenced by Home and
Foreign wage settlements through strategic interactions.
14Coricelli et al. (2000) introduced for the rst time the optimal price setting in the literature on nominal
wage bargaining systems.
15 In deriving the following expression, we neglect the costant  log 
( 1) .
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4 Ination-employment trade-o¤
This section explains how a move from a NMP regime, i.e. a setup where each country has
its own CB setting the money supply, to a MU with a common CB may a¤ect the trade-o¤
between ination and employment for the CB. Henceforth we base the comparison on the
results obtained under a NMP regime in Cuciniello (2007).
In setting her optimal monetary policy the CB faces a trade-o¤ between ination and
employment. Since all rms have the same reaction function, from cost minimization we
achieve the following aggregate demand for labor
Lc = (Yc)
1
 =

Mc
Pc
 1

; c 2 [H;F ] (23)
where the second equality stems from equation (13) and (14). Then taking logs and
plugging equation (20) into equation (23) yields
lc  logLc = mc   !c: (24)
Now the MU Phillips curve is obtained by solving for money supply equation (24) and
substituting it into (22),
U = (1  )lU + !U (25)
where lU  lH + (1  )lF . The slope of the Phillips curve in the MU is hence
dU
dlU
= 1   > 0: (26)
It can be shown16 that under a NMP regime the slope of the Home Phillips curve is given
by,
dN
dlH
= 1   > 0: (27)
It is apparent that the slope of the Phillips curve depends on the monetary regime set
up in the country as the following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 1 The formation of a MU leads a change in the trade-o¤ between ination
and employment faced by the CB so that the Phillips curve is atter in the MU, d
N
dlH
> d
U
dlU
:
Intuitively, the impact of money supply on aggregate employment is always equal to
one (see equation (24)). Conversely, the general level of price is a¤ected di¤erently by the
CB in a MU and under a NMP. Under oating exchange rates, the Home CB inuences
the CPI via the producer price index and the nominal exchange rate. In a MU this second
channel is ruled out. The Proposition 1 simply states that the two channels of transmission
16See Cuciniello (2007).
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of the monetary policy under a NMP regime have a larger impact on CPI than the single
channel of the common CB in a MU.
5 Monetary policy
This section examines the optimization problem of the common CB under a MU regime
and how the CB responds to wage hikes. Monetary policy is decided in the second stage
of the game.
The CB chooses the union-wide money supply taking as given nominal wages in the
economy and internalizing the rms reaction function so as to maximize (16) under the
MU Phillips curve investigated in the previous section (25). In other words, the CB acts as
Stackelberg-follower player vis-à-vis trade unions (Stackelberg leaders) and as Stackelberg-
leader vis-à-vis rms (Stackelberg followers).
The CB payo¤ (16) may be rewritten as

 = lU   k
2
(lU )2   U
2
 
U
2
:
Thus the rst order condition of the CB is given by17
d

dmU
=   klU   U
dU
dlU
U = 0() (28)

k
  lU   U
U (1  )
k
= 0:
According to expression (28), as long as the employment level is below the competitive
one18, =k (see equation (38)), it is optimal for the CB to fuel a positive ination rate
through her monetary policy.
Moreover, relation (28) shows the role played by the Phillips curve in the CB balances
of unemployment and ination. The weight attached to ination depends on the degree of
conservatism and the slope of the Phillips curve. As a matter of fact, both CBC and the
slope of the Phillips curve have the same function: they determine the relative signicance
attached to ination by the CB. It is easy to see that, ceteris paribus, the e¤ect of a
atter Phillips curve is similar to the e¤ect of smaller CBC. The CB will adopt a more
accommodating monetary policy either with a smaller degree of conservatism or a atter
Phillips curve. In both cases the CB would realize a higher loss from reducing ination
rather than unemployment19.
17Since the CB is a large agent, prots are not taken as given.
18 i.e. the level of employment that maximizes the workerswelfare equating the consumption/leisure
marginal rate of substitution (k logL) to the (e¢ cient) technical rate of transformation ( 1

).
19We will see below that, since the CBs reaction function is common knowledge for labor unions, workers
anticipate the incentive of the CB to inate. In the "time-consistent" equilibrium the marginal benet to
higher ination exactly o¤sets the marginal cost. The monetary authority could inate above and beyond
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Using (22) and (24), we explicitly solve (28) for the money supply
mU =
+ [k   (1  )U ]!U
k + U (1  )2
: (29)
Drawing on Proposition 1 and equation (28), it is apparent that the marginal cost
faced by the CB is lower in the MU than under a oating exchange rate regime. It follows
that, ceteris paribus, the CB is encouraged to inject more money in the monetary system
so as to equate the marginal benet and marginal cost. However, the common CB cares
about MU employment that is not necessarily equal to the Home country level.
Now from equation (29) we can investigate how the CB reacts to change in Home
and Foreign wages. The following proposition underlines the importance of the degree of
conservatism in determining the tightening or the accommodation in the monetary policy
to a wage increase.
Proposition 2 For values of CBC below (above) bU = k(1 ) the CB accommodates
(contracts) the money supply response to Home and Foreign wage increases.
Proof. At a symmetric equilibrium, from equation (29) we obtain dmUd!U =
k (1 )U
k+U (1 )2
whose sign depends clearly on the CBC.
A rise in wages increases both ination and employment. A conservative CB, i.e.
when U >
k
(1 ) , responds to any wage hike by tightening her money supply since she
attaches more weight to ination than unemployment. Conversely, a populist CB, i.e.
when U <
k
(1 ) , cares more about unemployment than ination and so her response to
wage is accommodating.
6 Wage setting
In this section we evaluate how wage setting is a¤ected by the a shift from a NMP regime
to a MU.
In the rst stage of the game unions act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the monetary
authority and rms, i.e. the labor unions anticipate the reaction functions of the CB and
rms. Home union i chooses the rate of growth of the nominal wage, !i, so as to maximize
(15) subject to (4) and (29). In doing that the union takes prots, Di; and the nominal
wages set by the other unions at Home and abroad as given. The typical union i rst
order condition is hence20
(
d logWi;r
d!i
  sr   "r) + "rkli = 0; r 2 [N;U ] (30)
the worker (rational) expectations, but it is not in her interest to do so.
20See the Appendix for details.
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where sr is the impact e¤ect (elasticity) of !i on ination when the nominal wages of other
unions are taken as given in a monetary regime r 2 [N;U ]:
sN  d
N
d!i
=
1
nH
[ + (1  )HH   (1  )FH ] 2 (0; 1) (31)
sU  d
U
d!i
=

nH
[(1  )U + ] 2 (0; ) (32)
with HH (FH) representing the reduced form elasticity of Home (Foreign) money supply
to Home aggregate wages under a NMP regime, while U is the elasticity of union-wide
money supply to union-wide wages under a MU regime21. "r is the elasticity of labor
demand to the nominal wage of union i in the monetary regime r:
"N   dl
N
i
d!i
= 

1  1
nH

+ (1  HH)
1
nH
; (33)
"U   dl
U
i
d!i
= 

1  1
nH

+ (1  U )

nH
: (34)
Note that equation (33) and (34) are a weighted average of the elasticity of substitu-
tion among labor types and the elasticity of aggregate labor demand. Dividing (30) by
d logWi;r
d!i
  sr, we can express the rst order condition in terms of the real wage elasticity
of labor demand, r, as follows
22
(1  r) + krli = 0: (35)
Equation (35) shows that an increase in the union is wages has two opposing e¤ects on
the utility of workers. On one hand it increases the real wage and reduces employment;
since the latter e¤ect is larger, there is a reduction in consumption (the rst term in
(35)). On the other hand, a wage rise increases utility through leisure (the second term in
(35)). Thus, each union sets a nominal wage growth according to her consumption/leisure
preferences, k.
Under a NMP regime the elasticity of domestic labor demand (in absolute value) is
given by
N (
)  "N
1  sN =
1  cc + (nc   1)
nc   1 + c(1  cc) + (1   c) cc
2 (1;1) (36)
where H  1   and F  1  (1  ).
Similarly we may derive the labor demand elasticity in the Home and Foreign country
21See Appendix for details.
22Derivation in Appendix.
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under a MU regime as follows
U (
)  "U
   sU =
1  U + (nH   1)
nH   1 + (1  )(1  U )
2 (1;1): (37)
It is worth noticing that when unions internalize the impact of their wages on the CB
reaction abroad, FH , such variable increases the elasticity of labor demand
23. Intuitively,
an increase in Home wages boosts the price of the Home-produced good. The Foreign
country undergoes an imported ination since it consumes the Home good as well. Thus,
the Foreign CB is induced to counteract the inationary wage settlement with a restrictive
monetary policy so as to keep current account balance and consumption constant across
the two countries (see equation (11)).
In the next section we will see how employment and ination are determined by macro-
economic institutional variables that a¤ect the labor demand elasticity. In doing that we
will assume that the CBC is not a¤ected by the monetary regime, i.e. U = H = .
7 Equilibrium employment and ination
Since unions are identical, in a symmetric equilibrium li = l for all i = 1; :::; nH we can
derive employment from equation (35) as follows:
lr =

k

1  1
r

2 (0; 1): (38)
Equation (38) points out that equilibrium employment is an increasing function of the
elasticity of labor demand, r. When the elasticity of labor is nite (r < 1) unions
have some market power24. The smaller is the labor elasticity, the higher is the unions
incentive to raise her nominal wages. In fact, a nominal wage claim sends ripples through
employment to a less extent in presence of market power25. By contrast, when the elasticity
of labor demand goes to innity we achieve the competitive (optimal) level of employment

k .
The area-wide price level is calculated by plugging equation (38) into the CB reaction
function (28). Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, we obtain the ination rate in the two
regimes as follows
N =

(1  )


N
+
1  
N

(39)
23The elasticities of money supply with respect to nominal wages abroad,  cc, are always negative
(Cuciniello, 2007).
24As in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), equilibrium employment is at
suboptimal level.
25The monopolistic nature of the labor market and the e¤ects on employment are in accord with Blan-
chard and Kiyotaki (1987) results.
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U =

 (1  )


U
+
1  
U

: (40)
It is clear that labor market characteristics play a key role in determining equilibrium
ination as well. In particular, the ination rate is negatively a¤ected by the elasticity
of labor demand. Moreover, equation (39) and (40) indicate an ination bias. With no
precommitment of any kind for the monetary authority, this is a standard result in the
literature on the time inconsistency of monetary policies. We therefore can state that
Remark 3 The conventional wisdom that discretionary policymaking by the CB yields
an ination bias, while leaving employment at suboptimal levels, still holds in an open
economy when the elasticity of labor demand is nite.
It is crucial at this point to compare the labor demand elasticity N and U so as
to assess the impact of macroeconomic institutions on employment and ination. Before
doing that, it is worth noticing that if we assume identical labor demand elasticity, i.e.
U = N and 

U = 

N , ination is lower under a NMP than in a MU for a given level of
employment. Since the Phillips curve is atter in a MU, the common CB has a stronger
incentive to inate as long as the employment level is below the competitive one. Non-
atomistic trade unions anticipate the reduced cost faced by the common CB in terms of
ination and demand for higher wages which, in turn, lead to higher ination.
However as shown in the Appendix, the elasticities of money supply to nominal wage
di¤er among the two regimes and, consequently, the labor demand elasticity. Removing
the assumption of equality renders the framework richer. The labor market structure (i.e.
the labor demand elasticity) is in fact ultimately determined by the number of unions, the
elasticity HH and FH ; when the monetary policies are uncoordinated, and U with a
common CB (see equation (36) and (37)). Thus, in the following section we assess how
CBC, CWS and country size may modify the labor demand elasticity.
7.1 Role of central bank conservatism
How do employment and ination depend on the CBC? Rewriting the labor demand
elasticity with respect to the real wage as follows26
r =
r
k
sr
d logWi;r
d!i
  sr
+
nH   1
nH

d logWi;r
d!i
  sr
; (41)
where N  H  1   and U  1  .
It is clear that a higher degree of conservatism has two opposing e¤ects on labor
unions. On the one hand, a non-atomistic wage setter becomes aware of the fact that an
increase in her nominal wages causes higher ination which, in turn, reduces employment
26The elasticity of labor is obtained by substituting the CB reaction function in terms of aggregate labor
into li =  (!i   !) + l and di¤erentiating with respect to !i:
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through the CB reaction function (equation (28)). The higher is the degree of CBC, the
more severe are the employment consequences of wage aggressiveness27. Drawing on Lippi
(2003) terminology we refer to it as adverse output e¤ect.
On the other hand, since a conservative CB leads unions to perceive less the inationary
impact of their wage, they also anticipate the real wage of other unions to decrease to a
lesser extent and, hence, the shift of labor demand towards cheaper labor types is smaller28.
This adverse competition e¤ect encourages wage aggressiveness (Lippi, 2003).
Now it may be interesting analyzing the two limit cases of a CB ultra-populist and
ultra-conservative. Letting the CBC go to zero, i.e. assuming that the CB does not care
about ination but only about agentsutility, we obtain the monopolistic competition level
of employment29
[l]=0 =

k

1  1


: (42)
When the CB is ultra-populist the strategic interaction channel between trade unions and
CB is halted30. In such a case, the employment level is below the Pareto e¢ cient one, k ,
and it depends on the degree of substitutability among labor types. As specied in section
5, an ultra-populist CB accommodates any domestic wage hike one-to-one which implies
that wage setters can not a¤ect employment.
The other extreme case of a CB that cares only about ination, i.e. an ultra-conservative
CB, yields the following equilibrium employment level under a NMP and a MU regime
respectively
lim
!1
l =

k
0@1  1
1
nH
k+F 
2
F
kN+F F (1 ) +

1  1nH


1A (43)
lim
!1
l =

k
0@1  1
1
nH
1
1  +

1  1nH


1A : (44)
From the relation (42), (43) and (44), we can make the following remark.
27Formally this can be seen by di¤erentiating the rst term of equation (41) with respect to CBC:
d
d

N
k
sN
1 sN

= N
k
sN
1 sN

1

+
dsN
d
1 sN

=
k(nH 1)(k+F 2F )2N
[k(nH 1)(k+F 2F )+nHF NF (F 1)+nH(k+F F )2N ]
2 > 0
where F  1   (1   ) and F is the degree of the Foreign CBC. In a MU, dd

U
k
sU
1 sU

=
k(1 )(nH )
[nH (1 )2+k(nH )]2
> 0:
28Formally this can be seen by di¤erentiating the second term of equation (41) with respect to CBC:
d
d

nH 1
nH

1 sN

= nH 1
nH

1 sN
dsN
d
1 sN =  
kn2H (k+F 
2
F )
2F [kH+F F (1 )]
(nH 1)[k(nH 1)(k+F 2F )+nHF NF (F 1)+nH(k+F F )2N ]
2 <
0 and in a MU d
d

nH 1
nH

1 sU

=   kn2H (1 )2
(nH 1)[nH (1 )2+k(nH )]2
< 0:
29The values of r in the case of an ultra-populist and ultra-conservative CB are derived in the Appendix.
30The CB has only one target (employment) and hence the trade-o¤ between ination and employment
in its optimal monetary policy is prevented. An increase in nominal wage will cause an equal increase in
money supply. This implies that labor unions can not a¤ect their real wages.
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Remark 4 (i) In the case of an ultra-populist CB, when  = 0, the labor demand elasticity
under a NMP regime, N , and the labor demand elasticity in a MU, U , coincide and are
equal to ; (ii) in the case of an ultra-conservative CB, when  ! 1, the labor demand
elasticity under a NMP regime, N , is always smaller than the labor demand elasticity in
a MU.
According to Remark 4, if a CB does not care about ination before and after a move
to MU, the regime shift does not have any impact on the labor demand elasticity which
is equal to the labor substitution elasticity. This is due to the fact that when  = 0, the
CB has only one target (the employment level) which can be always achieved ruling out
the strategic interaction with the labor unions through the price level. The CB in fact
accommodates any Home wage hike one-to-one so that unions can not modify their real
wage.
Notice that, under uncoordinated monetary policies, even though a domestic CB does
not care about ination at all, the CB abroad always counteracts domestic wage aggres-
siveness with a restrictive monetary policy which, in turn, causes a depreciation of the
domestic exchange rate. This boosts ination further and acts as a discipline e¤ect on
wage claims, since a nominal wage increase ends in a real wage improvement to a lesser
extent. Nevertheless, when  = 0, also the Foreign CB impact to domestic wages fades
away. As a matter of fact, the (negative) response of the CB abroad to a domestic wage
hike is exactly o¤set by the (positive) response induced by the expansionary money supply
at Homey31.
By contrast, the second part of Remark 4 states that, when a CB cares only about
ination, the labor demand elasticity is larger in a MU than under a NMP regime. The
main reason for a such result is due to the change in the slope of the Phillips curve (see
section 4). The atter Phillips curve in a MU entails that, ceteris paribus, the CB is willing
to forego a larger level of employment in order to stabilize ination. It is worth noticing
that the presence of a Foreign CB under uncoordinated monetary policies increases the
employment consequences of domestic wage rises but Remark 4 stresses that, with an
ultra-conservative CB, the adverse output e¤ect in a MU is always larger than under a
NMP regime and, consequently, it discourages wage aggressiveness to a larger extent.
Is labor demand elasticity and, hence, macroeconomic consequences more sizeable with
a conservative or liberal CB? As the following proposition points out, this depends on the
monopolistic distortion in the factor market.
Equation (43) and (44) show that when a CB has ination as overriding objective,
the employment level may be larger or smaller than equation (42). Thus the idea that an
ultra-conservative CB can always restore e¢ ciency is rejected. In general labor demand
elasticity and, hence, the macroeconomic consequences of a conservative CB depends on
31Domestic and foreign money supply are strategic complements (see Cuciniello, 2007).
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the monopolistic distortion in the factor market as summarized in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 5 (i) For a number of unions nH 2 (1;1), an increase in CBC raises
employment in a MU and under a NMP regime only if  < 11  and  <
k+F 
2
F
kN+F F (1 ) ,
respectively. (ii) If either nH = 1 or nH !1, the impact of CBC on employment is nil.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As  rises, the elasticity of money supply with respect to local wages switches from
positive to negative values. Thus, an increase in CBC reduces the inationary repercus-
sions of wage settlement and enlarges the unemployment consequences (as apparent in
equations (31)-(34)). Since the CBC a¤ects the rst term (adverse output e¤ect) of the
elasticity of labor demand (41) positively and the second one (adverse competition e¤ect)
negatively, the e¤ect of CBC on the adverse output e¤ect prevails only if the condition
in Proposition 5 holds. In other words, if labor power is sizeable, i.e.  is su¢ ciently
small, the i-th union understands that ination (caused by her nominal wage rise) reduces
employment by triggering a restrictive monetary policy32. On the contrary, if  is large,
since the inationary consequences of a wage claim are kept down by a more conservative
CB, unions anticipate a less reduction in the real wages of their competitors yielding wage
aggressiveness.
The impact of CWS on employment will be tackled in the next section. However the
second part of Proposition 5 states that monetary policy is neutral in the case of a single
all-encompassing union (nH = 1) and when unions are atomistic (nH ! 1). It is worth
noticing that when nH ! 1 unions do not perceive wage demands to have any impact
on ination (sr = 0), and when nH = 1 wage di¤erentials are ruled out. In both cases
monetary neutrality arises since unions perceive they can not a¤ect the real wages of the
other unions33. The assumption of non-atomistic and uncoordinated wage setting is hence
crucial when wages are negotiated in nominal terms (Lippi, 2003).
What about the Foreign monetary policy under a NMP regime? In Cuciniello (2007) it
is shown that the CB abroad always counteracts domestic wage demands by a restrictive
monetary policy which triggers the depreciation of the domestic exchange rate. This
boosts ination further dampening wage claims, since a nominal wage increase ends in
a real wage improvement to a lesser extent. Thus, the higher is the Foreign CBC, the
stronger is domestic wage restraint.
Nevertheless, if the domestic CB is ultra-populist or wage setters are atomistic, the
Foreign CB impact on domestic wages fades away. This is because the strategic interaction
between CB and unions is broken and the (negative) response of the CB abroad to a
32Similarly a wage increase is perceived by the i-th union to rise aggregate real wage (calculated by
taking account of the producer price index) which dampens its wage demands.
33The source of non-neutrality in policy games is analysed in Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004).
18
domestic wage hike is exactly o¤set by the (positive) response of the ultra-populist CB at
Home or is perceived nil by atomistic wage setters34.
As to ination, equation (39) and (40) reveal the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (i) in the absence of di¤erent strategic e¤ects, i.e. U = N and U = 

N ,
the ination rate under a NMP regime is always lower than in a MU for a given level of
employment. (ii) A higher degree of the CBC, , reduces the ination bias (d
r
d < 0).
Proof. The rst part of the proposition is immediately proved by observing equation (39)
and (40). For the second part, see equation (53).
The motive the shift to a MU raises ination is the di¤erent trade-o¤ between employ-
ment and ination faced by the common CB. Since the Phillips curve in a MU is atter
than under a NMP regime, the common CB has stronger incentive to resort to surprise in-
ation (Rogo¤, 1985b). Unions anticipate this inationary inducement and strive to keep
CB from modifying their real wages which culminates in a higher inationary bias. In this
respect, Proposition 6 explains why the ECB has a statute that is more conservative than
the one of the pre-MU Bundesbank considered the most conservative CB in Europe (Piga,
2000).
Contrary to Coricelli et al. (2004) where a higher degree of CBC is always associated
with lower ination and unemployment, a more conservative CB in this model does curb
ination while reduces unemployment only if the adverse output e¤ect is stronger than the
adverse competition e¤ect. The di¤erent upshot in Coricelli et al. (2004) is mainly due to
the absence of labor substitutability in the production function. Thus, the adverse output
e¤ect always dominates the adverse competition e¤ect and a more ination averse CB
makes unions perceive higher labor demand elasticity, which results in lower real wages.
Now according to Proposition 5, the impact of CBC on labor elasticity depends on the
predominance of the adverse output or the competition e¤ect. Hence, employment will be
an increasing function of CBC if the labor market distortion are high. Since the adverse
output e¤ect is always larger in a MU relative to the adverse output e¤ect under a NMP
regime, three cases are feasible35.
First, the adverse competition e¤ect may prevail in both regimes (Figure 1). Employ-
ment is therefore a decreasing function of CBC and an ultra-populist CB is the rst best
for the economy in terms of employment. Note that, under a NMP regime, an increase in
Foreign CBC boosts employment at Home by raising labor demand elasticity. However,
employment level is unambiguously higher in a MU when the CB is ination averse.
Second, the adverse competition e¤ect may prevail under a NMP regime but not in a
MU (Figure 2). In such a case labor market power is low at country level but relatively
34When the domestic CB does not care about ination and wage setters are atomistic, the labor demand
elasticity is equal to .
35Analytically proved in the Appendix. As for the following simulation, we let nH = 3,  = 1=2, k = 1
and  = 3=4.
19
Figure 1: Employment and CBC when adverse competition e¤ect prevails in both regimes.
For values of  > b the common CB is conservative, while for values of  < b is populist.
relevant in the union-wide economy36. This could be, for instance, the situation of UK vis-
à-vis the EMU where unions do not play a key role in the domestic labor market and the
national CB is liberal. An ultra-populist CB maximizes employment under a NMP regime.
However, if the CB is ination averse, the move to the EMU unambiguously improves
employment. In other words, an ultra-populist CB under a NMP regime produces only
a second best result for UK since an ultra-conservative ECB might increase employment
further.
Finally, labor market distortions can be sizeable under both regimes (Figure 3) so
that CBC always boosts employment. Note that an increase in the Foreign CB boosts
employment in the domestic country since it raises the labor demand elasticity. However,
there exists some "small" level of CBC associated with a higher employment level under
a NMP regime; indeed, with an ultra-conservative CB, employment is unambiguously
larger in a MU. The possibility of higher labor demand elasticity under a NMP is due to
the Foreign CB restrictive policy that in presence of a populist Home CB reinforces the
discipline e¤ect on wage settlement37.
7.2 Role of centralization of wage setting
What is the e¤ect of the number of unions on employment and ination? Here we tackle
these questions holding constant the degree of CBC so as to focus only on the degree of
CWS.
From equations (36)-(40), union numerosity a¤ects employment and ination via the
elasticity of labor demand, r. In particular, an increase in the labor market elastic-
ity, i.e. in the competitiveness of labor market structure, diminishes both ination and
unemployment.
36 It may be due to some sort of friction in labor mobility across countries, e.g. language di¤erences,
bureaucracy and legal barriers.
37The possibility that such a result arises is analytically derived in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Employment and CBC when adverse competition e¤ect prevails under a NMP
regime but not in a MU. For values of  < b the common CB is populist, while for values
of  > b is conservative.
Figure 3: Employment and CBC when adverse output e¤ect prevails in both regimes. For
values of  < b the common CB is populist, while for values of  > b is conservative.
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Once again the adverse output and competition e¤ect play a fundamental function
in settling the impact of the CWS on macroeconomic outcomes as summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 7 (i) For a given level of CBC, an increase (decrease) in CWS, smaller
(larger) nH , reduces (raises) ination and raises (reduces) employment under a MU and
a NMP regime if  < 11  and  <
k+F 
2
 c
kN+F F (1 ) , respectively; (ii) for a value of  =
b
such that the CB is neither conservative or populist, the elasticity of labor demand is
always larger in a MU than under a NMP regime.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Intuitively, a non-atomistic labor union sets a higher nominal wage for her members
as long as this does not reduce their employment, i.e. if her real aggregate wage does not
exceed the real aggregate wage38. Thus, the smaller is the number of unions, the more
each union internalizes the inationary repercussions of their wage claims (internalization
e¤ect). On one side, the wage setter expects a higher ination rate in the wake of an
increase in nominal wage and, hence, less consequences on the aggregate real wage and
the aggregate labor demand. This entails wage aggressiveness. On the other side, a higher
level of centralization lets union anticipate that her own wage demand nishes in a higher
aggregate nominal wage which, ceteris paribus, raises the real wage. This second e¤ect
discourages wage aggressiveness and is overwhelming if the conditions in Proposition 7
hold, i.e. when monopoly distortions are high enough so as to lead a large union to perceive
an increase in her own nominal wage as a raise in her real relative wage (Cavallari, 2004).
Now we assess graphically the three conceivable combinations of the adverse output
and competition e¤ect at Home. Since ination and employment are monotonic functions
of labor demand elasticity, r, we focus on the linkage between this key variable and
CWS. In order to control for the CBC, we assume that the CB is neither conservative nor
populist39.
When the adverse output e¤ect is larger than the adverse competition one, monopoly
distortions are relatively high and a more CWS lets unions internalize the unemployment
consequences of their wage demand through the CB reaction function (see equation (41))40.
Under such circumstances, labor demand elasticity is decreasing in the number of unions
and converging to  in presence of atomistic wage setters (as illustrated in Figure 4).
By contrast, if the adverse competition e¤ect is larger than the adverse output one, a
more decentralized wage setting renders unions relatively less aware of their inationary
38When employment is below the Pareto-e¢ cient level, the welfare gain of a reduction in employment is
lower than the welfare loss of a reduced consumption.
39Note that the value of CBC for which HH and U are equal to zero is b = k(k+F 2F )(1 N )F (k+F F ) under
a NMP regime and b = k
(1 ) in a MU.
40Multinational rms, for instance, may indirectly promote international wage coordination menacing
to move the production where labor costs are lower (Calmfors, 2001).
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wage settlement but increases the demand of rms for cheaper labor. In such a case,
a competition e¤ect would discourage wage aggressiveness to a larger extent since by
assumption is higher than the adverse output (Figures 5).
Finally Figure 6 illustrates the case in which the adverse output e¤ect prevails in a MU
but not under a NMP regime. If the monetary unication induces to higher centralization
at the union-wide level, macroeconomic performance improves.
Figure 4: Labor demand elasticity and CWS when the adverse output e¤ect prevails and
HH = U = 0.
The results in this section are in sharp contrast with the U-shaped curve à la Calmfors
and Dri¢ ll (1988). In order to have the U-shaped relationship between the CWS and
economic performance three assumptions have to be satised41:
(a) There exists a monotonic relation between the CWS and the internalization e¤ect.
(b) An increase in CWS always reduces competition in the labor market.
(c) In a decentralized wage setting the competition e¤ect prevails on the internaliza-
tion one, while under a centralized wage setting is the internalization e¤ect to be
dominant.
Condition (a) always holds in our model, while (b) is met only if the adverse output
e¤ect is smaller than the adverse competition one. The union is labor demand elasticity
with respect to her wage is an indicator of the degree of competitiveness in the labor mar-
ket: an elastic labor demand shrinks monopoly power in the labor market. As said before,
this elasticity can be increasing or decreasing in the CWS. However, the third assump-
tion (c) is never satised since with atomistic wage setters (i.e. monopolistic competition,
nH !1) the labor demand elasticity converges to .
41These conditions are pointed out in Guzzo and Velasco (1999).
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Figure 5: Labor demand elasticity and CWS when the adverse competition e¤ect prevails
and HH = U = 0.
Figure 6: Labor demand elasticity and CWS when the adverse competition e¤ect prevails
under NMP regime but not in a MU with HH = U = 0.
24
Figure 7: Home employment, CBC and nH for  small.
7.3 Interactions between central bank conservatism and centralization
of wage setting
Here we combine the e¤ect of CWS and CBC on employment and ination relying on the
results obtained in the previous sections. As for employment, the upshots for the Home
country in a MU are shown in Figure 7 and 842.
When  is small, according to Proposition 5, employment is an increasing function of
CBC as in Figure 7. An ination averse CB is, actually, willing to contract her money
supply so as to create more unemployment in the economy and reduce ination. Labor
unions are aware of the unemployment threat arising from a conservative CB and hold
down their wage demands.
Moreover, for a given level of CBC, employment is always decreasing in the num-
ber of unions which is inversely related to their degree of internalization. With a single
all-encompassing union, employment is maximized independently of the monetary conser-
vatism. In such a context, it is not necessary to carry out a monetary contraction threat,
for coordinated wage setters fully internalizes the aggregate labor demand. Note that in
the case of monopolistic competition, i.e. when nH goes to innity, unions do not inter-
nalize at all the macroeconomic impact of their wage claims on ination and the strategic
interactions with the CB is ruled out43.
Conversely, in Figure 8 labor market distortions are less relevant and a higher degree
of CBC diminishes labor demand elasticity. Since unions are less concerned about the
aggregate unemployment consequences of their wage hikes, they are tempted to set higher
nominal wages which, in turn, increase their own relative real wages. In this case a more
conservative CB is particularly costly in presence of very few unions. In fact, the less is
the number of unions, the more they internalize the real wage gain. For a given level of
CBC, we see a sharp monotonicity between employment and decentralization of the wage
42The graphics under a NMP regime reveal indeed similar behavioral patterns.
43The labor demand elasticity is in fact equal to .
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Figure 8: Home employment, CBC and nH for  large.
bargaining.
Only an ultra-populist CB may nullify the chance of achieving higher real wages;
indeed, when  = 0 the level of employment is equal to the rst best regardless of the
number of unions, so that the monotonic relationship between employment and the number
of unions disappears. Furthermore, the decrease in employment stemming from a greater
monetary conservatism is dampened by the number of unions (the grid becomes at for
large nH). This conforms with the results in the earlier sections, where CBC does not
a¤ect labor elasticity as nH !1.
Next we account for the joint e¤ect of the number of unions and CBC on the rate of
ination. The simulation is contained in Figure 9 and 10.
In both case ination is a decreasing function of the degree of CBC as we expected.
The main di¤erence is the role played by the CWS with di¤erent degrees of . When
labor market distortion are high, a lower number of unions may reduce ination while it
does not have any impact if substitutability among labor types is substantial ( is high).
This means that the e¤ect of CBC on ination seems to be largest (smallest) at very high
level of CWS if  is low (high).
The reason why ination is not a¤ected by a large number of trade unions is related to
the internalization e¤ect. Atomistic wage setters (nH ! 1) do not perceive to have any
impact on ination (see equation (32)). A non-atomistic union, instead, realizes that an
increase in wage a¤ects positively ination triggering the response of the CB. What is key
to large unions, however, is that monetary conservatism may inuence their monopolistic
power. In Figure 9 they have high monopoly power and CBC reduces it by boosting the
elasticity of labor demand. By contrast, in Figure 10 monopoly power is low and CBC
increases it by diminishing the elasticity of labor demand.
Finally, drawing on the employment analysis, we can consider the joint e¤ect of the
number of unions and CBC on individual welfare. The welfare analysis vis-à-vis labor
market distortion is shown in Figure 11 and 12. The following proposition summarizes
the main results in terms of individual welfare.
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Figure 9: Home ination, CBC and nH for  small.
Figure 10: Home ination, CBC and nH for  large.
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Figure 11: Home welfare, CBC and nH for large .
Proposition 8 (i) A nationally centralized wage bargaining system maximizes individual
welfare if labor market distortion are sizeable. (ii) In presence of keen competition in the
labor market, an ultra-populist CB or atomistic wage setters are optimal for the society.
(iii) a MU is a welfare maximizing regime when labor market distortions are not sizeable.
(iv) a MU is a welfare maximizing regime when labor market distortions are sizeable if
nH = 1 or  is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As long as the employment level is below the optimal one, a rise in employment is wel-
fare augmenting. Hence, if labor market distortions are sizeable, we know that the smaller
is the number of the unions, the better is employment performance, and, consequently
welfare (see Proposition 7). Conversely, when  is large, the monopolistic competitive
outcome is optimal and both an ultra-populist CB and atomistic wage setters can repli-
cate it.
As to the welfare e¤ect of a monetary unication. Note that employment level and
hence welfare are increasing functions of labor substitutability, . As a matter of fact, the
higher is the labor substitution, the higher is the labor demand elasticity. Thus we know
that labor markets with sizeable distortions will perform worse, in terms of employment
and welfare, than labor markets where such distortions are lower or nil.
The comparison of welfare between the two regimes when  is large is shown in Fig-
ure 11. The surface with a thicker mesh stands for the MU regime, while the surface
with a thinner mesh points out the NMP regime both with an ultra-populist and ultra-
conservative foreign CB. It is apparent that the shift to a MU is unambiguously welfare
increasing if the CB cares about ination. In this respect, the higher adverse output e¤ect
in the MU vis-à-vis the NMP one renders U more elastic than N for any value of  6= 0.
By contrast, in the case of ultra-populist CB, a move to a MU leaves welfare unchanged44.
44Remember both labor demand elasticity are equal to  with an ultra-populist CB.
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Figure 12: Home welfare, CBC and nH for small .
When labor market exhibits signicant monopoly distortions, labor demand elasticity
is positively associated with monetary conservatism. However, for some small level of
CBC, the elasticity of labor demand may be higher under a NMP regime than in a MU.
This result is in contrast with Cavallari (2004) where a move to a MU always increases
labor demand elasticity (and hence welfare) when monopoly distortions are relevant.
Here as shown for instance in Figure 12 in presence of an ultra-conservative Foreign
CB, welfare under a NMP regime may exceed the MU one if the Home CB is relatively
populist. However, as we expected, a single monopoly union leads to the rst best in both
regimes45 and, for a su¢ ciently high level of CBC, a MU becomes the second-best choice
in presence of more than a trade union.
8 Conclusions
The creation of a monetary union (MU) may alter the incentives to reform the labor
market. This issue is particularly relevant in Europe where labor markets are characterized
by the presence of large trade unions and the impact of domestic wages on the union-wide
ination rate is diluted. Switching to a MU, the monetary policy of the central bank (CB)
is now addressed to union-wide targets instead of country-specic ones which implies a
new trade-o¤ between ination and employment in setting her optimal policy.
We have investigated the strategic impact of centralization in wage setting (CWS) and
CB conservatism (CBC) on economic performance by extending Lippi (2003) analysis so
as to introduce monopolistic competition and openness to trade in the product market.
We nd in line with the case of a oating exchange rate regime (Cuciniello, 2007) that
the move towards higher level of CWS and CBC may increase employment and reduce
ination in a MU if monopoly distortions in the labor market are signicant. In such a case,
a conservative CB is willing to contract her money supply by causing more unemployment
45 In the Appendix it is proved that welfare in a fully centralized wage bargaining system is always higher
in a MU than under a NMP regime.
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in the economy and controlling ination. Labor unions are aware of the unemployment
threat arising from a conservative CB and hold down their wage demands. Since the
number of unions is inversely related to their degree of internalization of the monetary
threat, more centralization will increase the economic performance.
The comparison between the national monetary policy (NMP) regime and the MU
reveals that a move to a MU boosts ination in the absence of strategic e¤ects. This
is due to a atter Phillips curve faced by the common CB. However, when strategic
interactions between CB(s) and trade unions are taken into account, the shift to a MU
unambiguously increases welfare and employment when monopoly distortions are sizeable
either in presence of a su¢ ciently conservative CB or with fully CWS.
Conversely, when labor market distortions are less relevant, a higher degree of CBC
diminishes labor demand elasticity. Since unions are less concerned about the aggregate
unemployment consequences of their wage hikes, they are tempted to set higher nominal
wages which, in turn, increase their own relative real wages. In this case a more conserva-
tive CB is particularly costly in presence of very few unions. In fact, the less is the number
of unions, the more they internalize the real wage gain. As for the welfare analysis, the
paper shows that in presence of keen competition in the labor market, an ultra-populist
CB or atomistic wage setters are optimal for the society and a shift to a MU regime is
unambiguously welfare improving.
9 Appendix
Elasticities of money supply to nominal wages. Following Cuciniello (2007) let
H  1  and F  1 (1 ) be the slope of the Phillips curve under a NMP regime
in the Home and Foreign country respectively46. The elasticity of domestic money supply
to local nominal wages is47
cc = 1 
c(k +  c
2
 c)c
k2 + c cc c(1  ) + k( c2 c + c2c)
; c 2 [H;F ] (45)
Since both domestic and Foreign CBC negatively a¤ects HH , it can range from 1 to
  1  in the case of ultra-populist (when H ! 0) and ultra-conservative (when H !
1^ F !1) CB, respectively. The elasticity of money supply to nominal wage abroad
is instead given by48
 cc =  
 cc c(1  c)c
k2 + c cc c(1  ) + k( c2 c + c2c)
; c 2 [H;F ] : (46)
46These results are derived in Cuciniello (2007).
47Note that HH = FF only if  = 1=2 and H = F .
48Note that HF = FH only if  = 1=2.
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Thus the range of FH is   1  and 0 in presence of an ultra-conservative (H !1^F !
1) and populist CB (H !1_F !1) respectively. In the case of a MU, the elasticity
of money supply to union-wide wages is given by
U = 1 
(1  )U
k + U (1  )2
whose range spanned by CBC is

  1  ; 1

: The impact of CBC on U is
dU
dU
=   k(1  )
[k + (1  )2U ]2
< 0:
A typical union rst order condition. The typical union i maximizes (15) with
respect to !i subject to (4) and (29), taking as given prots, Di; and the nominal wages
set by other unions at Home and abroad. Note that individual union dividend ows are
Di = PH
YH
n (1   ). In a symmetric equilibrium in which all Di are the same, prot per
union is
Di = PHYH(1  ) = (1  )PCi:
From the budget constraint (4), we obtain for all domestic rms
PCi =WiLi + (1  )PCi
so that PCi =WiLi. The rst order condition with respect to !i yields
(
d logWi
d!i
  d logP
d!i
+
d logLi
d!i
) + k logLi
d logLi
d!i
= 0 (47)
where we used 1Ci
dCi
d!i
= WiLiPCi
h
d logWi
d!i
  d logPd!i +
d logLi
d!i
i
and WiLiPCi = . Dividing expres-
sion (47) by d logWid!i  
d logP
d!i
and using the real wage elasticity denition     d logLi
d log
Wi
P
yields equation (35).
Analysis of CBC and macroeconomic outcome. From equation (36) and (37), it
appears that the value of labor demand elasticity is mainly determined by the elasticity of
money supply to nominal wages. According to the degree of CBC, the range of 1 HH is
0 and k+F 
2
F
(1 )F F+kN in the case of ultra-populist and ultra-conservative CB respectively.
Similarly 1 U is equal to 0 and 11  in presence of an ultra-populist and ultra-conservative
CB respectively. When 1   HH = 0 and 1   U = 0, i.e. in presence of an ultra-liberal
domestic CB, the elasticity of labor demand is  in both regimes. When the CB is ultra-
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conservative, instead, the labor demand elasticities are49
lim
!1
N =
1
nH
k + F 
2
F
kN + F F (1  )
+

1  1
nH

; (48)
lim
!1
U =
1
nH
1
1   +

1  1
nH

: (49)
These relations prove equation (42), (44) and (43). In general, the sign of dNd not only
depends on the adverse output and competition e¤ect but also on the other CBC as follows:
dN
d
=
k(nH   1)(k + F 2F )N

k + F 
2
F   (kN + F F (1  ))

k(nH   1)(k + F 2F ) + nH(F NF (1  ) + k2N )
2 : (50)
The sign of dNd is hence
sign

k + F 
2
F
kN + F F (1  )
  

:
The sign of dNdF is instead always positive:
dN
dF
=
k(1  F )F (1  N )N [k(nH   1) + nHN ]
k(nH   1)(k + F 2F ) + nH(F NF (1  ) + k2N )
2 > 0: (51)
In the case of a MU the sign of
dU
d
=
k(nH   1)(1  ) [1  (1  )]
[k(nH   1) + nH(1  )2]2
(52)
is given by
sign

1
1     

:
The rst part of Proposition 5 is proved by taking the partial derivative of (38), (39) and
(40) with respect to CBC and using equation (50) and (52) as follows:
dl
d
=

k
1
2r
dr
d
d
d
=   
rr
2

1 +

r
dr
d

< 0: (53)
Notice that the term in brackets in equation (53) is always positive since
 r drd  < 1: The
adverse output e¤ect under a NMP regime is an increasing function of F and is always
smaller than the adverse output in a MU, 11  . Now what remains to assess is whether
the labor demand elasticity in MU and NMP intersect in the (; r) plane. As a matter
49Note that k+F 
2
F
(1 )F F+kN <
1
1  :
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of fact, the NMP and MU labor demand elasticity coincide when  = 0 and the latter is
larger than the former when  ! 1. Thus it is su¢ cient to analyze if the slope of dNd
evaluated at  = 0 is greater than dUd evaluated at  = 0. The impact of CBC on money
supply elasticity in both regimes at  = 0 is
dU
d

=0
=
(1  )(1  (1  ))
k(n  1) (54)
and 
dN
d

=0
=
H

k + F 
2
F   (kH + F F (1  ))

k(n  1)(k + F 2F )
: (55)
Note, rst, that expression (55) is an increasing function of F . When  >
1
1  the ratioh
dN
d
i
=0^F=0h
dU
d
i
=0
=
1     (1  )2
1    (1  )2 > 1 (56)
which implies that there not exists a level of  6= 0 where the labor demand elasticity
N and U are equal. When  <
1
1  the expression (56) holds i¤  <
1
1 +1  . In such
a case there exists a level of  6= 0 where the labor demand elasticity N and U intersect.
The second part of Proposition 5 is achieved by evaluating equation (50) at nH = 1 and
nH !1.
Analysis of CSW and macroeconomic outcome. The marginal impact on labor
elasticity of a more decentralized wage setting is
dN
dnH
=

(kN + F F (1  ))   (k + F 2F )

Z2
k(nH   1)(k + F 2F ) + nH(F NF (1  ) + k2N )
2
where Z2  N

k2 + FNF (1  ) + k(F 2F + 2N )

> 0 and the sign of N de-
pends on the
sign

   k + F 
2
F
kN + F F (1  )

By the same token, the derivative of the labor demand elasticity with respect to unions
numerosity is
dU
dn
=
( 1 + U ) [1  (1  )]
[n+ ( 1 + U )  U ]2
and the sign is determined by the
sign

   1
1  

which proves Proposition 7. Interestingly, both labor elasticity tends to  in presence of
atomistic wage setting (i.e. nH !1). In order to compare the e¤ect of CWS in the two
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regimes and get rid of the impact of domestic CBC, we assume in section 7.2 that the
CB is neither conservative nor populist, i.e. we evaluate the labor demand elasticity when
U = HH = 0 which yields
[U ]=bU = (n  1)   1n   (57)
and
[N ]=bH =
 
k + F 
2
F

[1 + (nH   1)]
F F (nHF   1 + N ) + k(nH   1 + N )
(58)
where bH = k(k+F 2F )(1 N )F (k+F F ) and bU = k(1 ) : There is no value of nH belonging to the
relevant domain in which the elasticity (57) and (58) cross each other50. The expression
(57) evaluated at nH = 1 yields
[U ]U=bU^n=1 = 11  : (59)
Note that expression (58) is an increasing function of foreign CB hence we evaluate it
when F !1 as follows:
[N ]H=bH^n=1^F!1 = F1  : (60)
It is apparent that expression (59) is always larger than (60).which proves Proposition 7.
Welfare and macroeconomic institutions. It is straightforward to compute that
welfare level as follows:
Ui =
1
2
2
k

1  1
r

2 

1  1
r

=
1
2
2
k

1  1
2r

: (61)
Now consider the problem of maximizing the individual welfare on the constraint set as
follows:
max
nH ;
Ui (62)
s:to nH  1 ^   0:
The solution of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions yields
if  >
k + F 
2
F
kN + F F (1  )
,  = 0 ^ nH > 1
if  <
k + F 
2
F
kN + F F (1  )
,  > 0 ^ nH = 1:
50Such a value is in fact n =  1

:
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If we evaluate the (61) at the nH = 1 and  = 0, we obtain
[Ui;N ]nH=1 =
2
2k
2641  1
k+F 
2
F
kN+F F (1 )
2
375 ; (63)
[Ui;U ]nH=1 =
2
2k
2641  1
1
1 
2
375 (64)
and
[Ui;N ]=0 = [Ui;U ]=0 =
2
2k

1  1
2

: (65)
It is apparent that expression (63) is greater (smaller) than expression (65) i¤  <
k+F 
2
F
kN+F F (1 ) ( >
k+F 
2
F
kN+F F (1 )). Similarly expression (64) is greater (smaller) than
expression (65) i¤  < 11  ( >
1
1 ). Moreover relation (64) is always larger than rela-
tion (63). Recall that both an ultra-populist CB and atomistic wage setters lead the labor
demand elasticity to be equal to , i.e. the case of monopolistic competition.
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